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Grodin Joseph
The Depublication Practice of the
California Supreme Court
Joseph R. Grodint
On increasingly numerous occasions since 1971, the California
Supreme Court has ordered that certain opinions of the court of appeal
be "depublished," that is, not printed in the Official Reports.I This
occurs even though the lower court deems the opinion to meet the ap-
plicable criteria for publication.2 And, I think it is fair to say, the
supreme court has not done this, in the vast majority of such occasions,
because it disagrees with the court of appeal over application of the
criteria. Rather, it has done this because a majority of the justices con-
" Associate Justice of the California Supreme Court.
1. Depublication is authorized by the California Constitution, article VI, § 14, which pro-
vides that "[t]he Legislature shall provide for the prompt publication of such opinions of the
Supreme Court and courts of appeal as the Supreme Court deems appropriate .... " That au-
thority is implemented through rule 976(c)(2) of the California Rules of Court, which provides
that "[an opinion certified for publication shall not be published, and an opinion not so certified
shall be published, on an order of the Supreme Court to that effect." The term "depublication" is
commonly used interchangeably with "decertification," the term derived from the language of the
Rules of Court.
No existing rule establishes the criteria for depublication or the process by which opinions are
depublished. However, one commentator has identified three procedures the supreme court has
used to decertify opinions. The first and most typical is for one of the litigants in the case to file a
petition for hearing with the supreme court after the court of appeal's opinion has been certified
for publication. Note, Decertiflcation of Appellate Opinions.: The Need/or Articulated Judicial
Reasoning and Certain Precedent in California Law, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1186 (1977). The
supreme court, instead of hearing the case or simply denying the petition, orders the opinion
decertified. Id. at 1200. The second procedure, very rarely used, is for interested parties to write
to the supreme court requesting depublication, no petition for hearing having been filed. Id. at
1186. The third procedure, also rarely used, is for the supreme court to act on its own to decertify
an opinion. Id.
According to unofficial tally, the supreme court ordered depublication of 20 cases in 1972, 22
in 1973, 12 in 1974, 45 in 1975, 34 in 1977, and 35 in 1978. Id. at 1200-06; Biggs, Censoring the
Law in Caifornia: Decertflcation Revisited, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1577, 1594-96 (1979).
2. The applicable criteria for publication are set forth as follows:
No opinion of a Court of Appeal. . .may be published in the Official Reports unless the
opinion:
(1) establishes a new rule of law, applies an existing rule to a set of facts significantly
different from those stated in published opinions, or modifies, or criticizes with reasons
given, an existing rule;
(2) resolves or creates an apparent conflict in the law;
(3) involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
(4) makes a significant contribution to legal literature by reviewing either the devel-
opment of a common law rule or the legislative or judicial history of a provision of a
constitution, statute, or other written law.
CAL. CT. R. 976(b).
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sider the opinion to be wrong in some significant way, such that it
would mislead the bench and bar if it remained as citable precedent.'
It seems to have been the dominant view within the court that the selec-
tive exercise of the depublication option is both practical and proper.
From outside the court, however, the perspective is different.
When I was a court of appeal justice, I viewed with dismay the prospect
that one of my own hardwrought masterpieces might thus be doomed
to oblivion. Persons outside the judiciary have expressed more sub-
stantial concerns, throughout which I sense a strong undercurrent of
feeling that goes beyond any specific defect in the depublication pro-
cess. The feeling is that depublication is somehow egregious per se-
that it smacks of an attempt to rewrite history, to censor the expression
of views, and perhaps even to carry out some secret agenda known only
to the court. While this attitude may appear quite unfounded to those
directly familiar with the process, it is nonetheless a widespread percep-
tion and one that should not be ignored.
In light of the opposition to depublication that has been expressed,
then, it seems appropriate for a member of the court to explain from his
perspective the reasons for the practice and its continuance. At the risk
of being considered foolhardy in the extreme, I undertake that task.
Depublication is best considered, I suggest, in three stages. First, in
order to put the process of depublication in context, it is necessary to
describe how the court functions. Second, depublication should be
compared to other methods the court uses to dispose of cases. Third,
alternatives, such as depublication with commentary and denial with




Adequate understanding of the depublication practice requires
some knowledge of how the court internally handles its caseload. Vari-
ous descriptions of the internal procedures of the court have appeared
3. See Note, supra note 1, at 1185 n.20 (quoting letter from California's former Chief
Justice Wright).
4. For example, a recent article by Professor Gerstein attacks depublication as a "process of
covert substantive review." Gerstein, "Law by elimination:" depublication in the California
Supreme Court, 67 JUDICATURE 292, 298 (1984). A leading newspaper, in an editorial entitled
Lawmaking by Suppression, suggests that the court uses depublication as a "form of damage con-
trol which enables the justices to bring about what they regard as the right result with a minimum
of adverse publicity." Sacramento Bee, Feb. 27, 1984, at B6, col. 1, B6, col. 2. It is ironic that the
Bee's editorial author charges the court with using depublication of determinate sentence cases to
promote shorter sentences, while we are just as roundly criticized by another commentator for
using depublication of two determinate sentence cases to permit longer sentences. See Yegan,
Depublication: The Missing Determinate Sentence Law Opinions, L.A. LAw., Apr. 1982, at 34, 37.
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in print heretofore.5 However, it may be useful to set forth my perspec-
tive of those procedures, to place my evaluation of the depublication
practice in context. It will then become apparent which cases are best
handled by depublication. This description will also demonstrate the
extent to which the court is overburdened, partially explaining its need
to use the depublication procedure.
A. The Supreme Court's Workload
The work of the supreme court revolves around two focal points.
One is the monthly "calendar," the focal point of the court's decisional
process. Calendar consists of from two to five days of oral argument
once a month during ten months of the year. When the court grants a
petition for hearing in a case, or issues an alternative writ in an original
proceeding, the Chief Justice assigns the case to one of the justices for
preparation of a "calendar memorandum." A memorandum analyzes
the issues and arguments presented, and recommends a disposition.
Copies of the memorandum on a particular case are distributed to each
justice prior to oral argument. Immediately after oral argument, the
justices confer on the case and take a tentative vote. If it appears that a
majority of the justices agree with the disposition recommended by the
memorandum, the author of the memorandum usually proceeds to
draft a proposed majority opinion. Otherwise, the Chief Justice re-
assigns the case to a justice in the majority.
When the opinion is drafted, copies are distributed to all the jus-
tices simultaneously. The original of the proposed opinion, together
with accompanying materials ("the box") is sent first to whichever jus-
tice voiced a differing view at conference, for the possible preparation
of a dissenting or concurring opinion. If such an opinion is filed, the
majority author is given an opportunity to respond, and thereafter the
box is circulated to each remaining justice for his or her signature on
one of the circulating opinions, or for the preparation of an additional
opinion, as he or she sees fit. Only when each justice has signed an
opinion and the authors of the opinions have given their approval are
the opinions formally filed.
All justices are of course continuously involved in the decisional
process, preparing for and participating in oral argument, drafting or
revising their own opinions, making suggestions, or preparing re-
sponses to the opinions of others. At any one moment there may be as
many as fifty boxes in circulation, and an individual justice may have
5. See, e.g., Goodman & Seaton, Foreword- Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings and
Current Concerns of the California Supreme Court, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 309, 309-16 (1974); Traynor,
Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 211, 214-17
(1957).
Vol. 72:514
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several boxes in his or her chambers, awaiting action. A justice may
find it impossible because of the pressure of other priorities to give a
case the immediate attention it deserves. Thus he or she may "pass"
the box to another justice, deferring his or her own consideration to a
later date. The process can at times be lengthy, particularly when a
justice raises new questions or objections that can only be answered by
further research or checking of the record. Nonetheless, the process
both permits and encourages all justices to give careful attention to the
arguments of the parties and to one another's views.
The second focal point of the justices' work is the screening pro-
cess, which revolves around the Wednesday conference. Each Wednes-
day throughout the year, except for calendar weeks and the first week
in July and August, the court meets in the chambers of the Chief Jus-
tice. There, we consider and take action upon petitions for hearing, for
extraordinary writs, and for a variety of other petitions and motions,
including State Bar disciplinary matters. On each of these matters a
conference memorandum has been prepared, either by the attorneys in
the court's central staff (who handle most criminal conference memo-
randa) or by a justice to whom the matter has been assigned in rota-
tional order, and his or her staff.
Whoever is responsible for preparation of the conference memo-
randum assigns it to either the "A-list" or the "B-list." The former
consists of those matters that appear more significant or controversial,
and therefore more appropriate for conference discussion. The latter
consists of those matters that require little discussion, as denial of the
petition or motion appears to be clearly indicated. The assignment is
tentative, however, for often a justice will request that a B-list matter
be continued for discussion as an A-list matter at a later date.
Subject to such requests, the court at conference approves the de-
nial recommendations on the B-list matters, and proceeds to discuss
each item on the A-list. First, the justice responsible for the memoran-
dum sets forth his or her views. Then, each justice in turn, beginning
with the most senior and ending with the Chief Justice, is given an
opportunity to comment and vote. Some items on the agenda are dis-
posed of very quickly-in a minute or two-while others require exten-
sive discussion. Ultimately, four votes are required for any
disposition.'
The volume of items on the Wednesday agenda has become in-
creasingly impressive. Not many years ago, it was rare for the agenda
to include more than twenty or twenty-five items.7 Now, it is rare for
6. See Mosk, The Supreme Court of California, 1973-1974--Foreword- The Rule of Four in
California, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 2 (1975).
7. In the early 1960's the total annual filings in the court fell to somewhere between 1300
1984]
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the agenda to include fewer than 100, and in conferences after a skip-
ped week, such as calendar week, the agenda often exceeds 170. Typi-
cally, about two-thirds of these items are B-listed, but the petitions and
memoranda have to be read and considered nevertheless. The job is
not one for a slow reader.'
While each justice has a distinctive approach in preparing for con-
ference, mine is probably typical. As each agenda item is received in
my chambers, it is assigned to a member of my staff. A memorandum
is prepared, with varying degrees of consultation on my part regarding
its contents and recommendation, and is then submitted to me for ap-
proval. After I have approved, the memorandum is duplicated and dis-
tributed to all justices. The deadline for submission to the secretary's
office, to permit timely duplication and distribution, is four o'clock of
the Thursday afternoon before conference.
Friday afternoon, I receive the petitions and memoranda from the
other justices and the court's central staff. These I take with me over
the weekend to read, making note of the cases that seem to me to re-
quire further research or discussion. Monday morning, I circulate
among my staff a list of cases, with individual assignments to members
of my staff, requesting either a brief supplemental memorandum or
elaboration at staff conference. Tuesday afternoon, I meet with my
staff and discuss the more challenging cases. Tuesday evening, I take
home for review the petitions and memoranda in my "own" cases, as
well as any other cases that seem to require further study. Conference
begins at 9:15 the following morning.
B. Disposition of Petitions for Hearing
There are various options available to the court when its juris-
diction is invoked by a petition for hearing or original petition for
extraordinary writ. One option, of course, is for the court to grant the
petition and keep the case for decision.9 Certainly the court ought not
grant a hearing simply because the court of appeal has written an opin-
ion with which the supreme court disagrees, nor should such disagree-
and 1600. By the mid-1960's, the numbers had begun to climb rapidly. 1966 JUD. COUNCIL CAL.
ANN. REP. 11-12; seealso P. STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES 194 (1981) (approximately 40 matters arose
per week in 1964, while only 20 arose per week in 1945).
8. Clearly the impact of this increase in the number of petitions filed is that "a substantial
amount of time must be spent by our highest Court not in deciding cases, but rather in deciding
not to decide them." Report of the Special Committee re Appellate Courts, The Court of Review:
A New Court for Cayifornia?, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 28, 29 (1972).
9. The absolute number of petitions granted has risen steadily over the last decade. In
1972-73 the court granted 181 petitions, while by 1981-82 that number had risen to 280. Because
of the steady rise in petitions filed during the same period, however, the percentage of grants
relative to the total number of petitions filed rose much less dramatically from 7.6% in 1972-73 to
8.3% in 1981-82. 1983 JUD. COUNCIL CAL. ANN. REP. 81, table iv.
[Vol. 72:514
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ment be prerequisite to a grant. Rather, the grant option is reserved for
those "important" cases appearing to require supreme court guid-
ance.' 0 Given the considerable limitations upon the court's time and
resources described above, and taking into account the burden of auto-
matic appeals in death penalty cases1' and state bar disciplinary mat-
ters, 12 the option to grant is not one that ought to be, or indeed can be,
exercised lightly."'
A second option open to the court is to grant the petition and hold
the case pending disposition of some other case that is awaiting deci-
sion by the court. Once the related case has been decided, the held case
can be retransferred to the court of appeal for decision."' Obviously,
the "grant and hold" option makes sense only when there is another
case pending before the court that involves the same or similar issues.
Even then a grant and hold is not always warranted. For example, if
the petitioner is seeking review of a trial court order prior to the trial,
and the issue will be reviewable upon appeal or habeas corpus, the
court may be reluctant to delay trial of the case until the related case is
10. California Rule of Court 29(a) provides:
A hearing in the Supreme Court after decision by a Court of Appeal will be ordered
(1) where it appears necessary to secure uniformity of decision or the settlement of im-
portant questions of law; (2) where the Court of Appeal was without jurisdiction of the
cause; or (3) where, because of disqualification or other reason, the decision of the Court
of Appeal lacks the coicurrence of the required majority of qualified judges.
11. As of this writing, 150 death penalty appeals are pending before the court. Most are not
yet in a posture for decision. These appeals are automatic and are "pending" once the trial court's
commitment is received by the clerk. However, many months will pass before the reporter's tran-
script is certified, the record is forwarded to this court, and both appellant and respondent have
fully briefed the appeal. Only then can the court prepare a calendar memorandum and set the
case for oral argument and decision.
Chief Justice Bird and the court have undertaken a number of steps in recent years to deal
more effectively with death penalty appeals. Additional law clerks have been added, attempts
have been made to expedite preparation of transcripts by court reporters, meetings have been held
with the death penalty coordinators from the Attorney General's and Public Defender's Offices,
and systems have been instituted for identifying and coordinating dispositive common issues.
Nevertheless, the burden remains substantial.
The automatic appeal burden has prompted several reform proposals, including suggestions
for consideration in the first instance of death penalty cases by the court of appeal, or by a special-
ized intermediate court with statewide jurisdiction. From the perspective of an overworked
supreme court justice, the proposals appear quite attractive, but they obviously require careful
scrutiny in terms of constitutional requirements and the administration of justice.
12. See Comment, Attorney Discipline and the California Supreme Court: Transfer of Direct
Review to the Courts of Appeal, 72 CALIF. L. REy. 252 (1984).
13. From time to time it is suggested, usually by someone outside the court, that the work-
load each justice can handle could be increased if greater responsibility was delegated to his or her
staff. That is a matter, of course, that each justice must evaluate personally. In my case, while I
am blessed with an extremely competent and experienced staff, I doubt that I could delegate re-
sponsibility further to any significant extent and still perform what I consider to be my constitu-
tional obligation.
14. See Comment, Case Dispositions by the California Supreme Court.- Proposed Alterna-
tives, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 788, 802-03 (1979).
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decided. Or, the court of appeal may have reached a result consonant
with the view expressed in the circulating majority opinion in the case
pending before the supreme court. In such a case there may be no need
for a grant and hold unless the court wishes to avoid anticipating the
probable outcome.
A third option for disposition arises when there is no opinion in
the court of appeal, as in the case of an extraordinary writ petition that
the court of appeal summarily denied, and the supreme court is of the
view that the matter warrants more complete appellate attention. The
court will usually grant the petition for hearing, and at the same time
retransfer the case to the court of appeal with directions to issue an
alternative writ. If there has been an appellate opinion, the "grant and
retransfer" option typically is used only when the retransfer can be ac-
companied by an "in light of' citation to a case subsequently decided-
a rare situation. Seldom has the court ordered reconsideration of an
appellate opinion that cites applicable authority but reaches the
"wrong" result. "
What should the court do when it considers a court of appeal opin-
ion to be "wrong," but the circumstances do not warrant either a grant
or grant and retransfer under existing practice and applicable criteria?
One answer might be simply to deny hearing, and hope that the error
will not be too seriously compounded before another court of appeal
gets around to setting things straight. That is, in fact, what the court
often does. In some situations, however, the risk of compounding the
error appears quite substantial-as when permitting the appellate opin-
ion to stand as citable precedent may result in building ultimately re-
versible error into a large number of trials. It is in such situations,
typically, that the court resorts to the decertification option.
II
CRITICISMS OF THE DEPUBLICATION PROCEDURE
A. Criticisms Enumerated
Despite its usefulness as an option available to the supreme court
for the disposition of petitions for hearing, depublication has been criti-
cized from many angles. For example, one commentator found decer-
tification to be a "valuable procedure, which should be retained if it
can be properly regulated,"' 6 but identified "three major failings" in
15. The retransfer "in light of" option is analogous to an order by the United States
Supreme Court granting, vacating, and remanding "for further consideration in light of" some
more recent Supreme Court decision. Use of "in light of" remands by the United States Supreme
Court has proven confusing to at least one commentator. See Hellman, "Granted, vacated, and
remanded'--shedding light on a dark corner of Supreme Courtpractice, 67 JUDICATURE 389 (1984).
16. Note, supra note 1, at 1199.
[Vol. 72:514
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current practice. 7 First, the author contended, the practice "fails to
comport with established standards of public exposure of judicial acts
because the decertification order fails to set forth the reasoning of the
supreme court,"' 8 thus leaving the litigants and the public without
guidance as to the applicable law. Second,
[s]ince no specific procedure has been developed to allow public notice
of petitions for decertification that the supreme court receives, the court
may hear arguments from one sector of the legal community and act
upon them before other interest groups can present their arguments or
learn of the need to submit their views.
19
This state of affairs, the author contended, may permit "special interest
groups" to influence decertification decisions.20 Finally, the author ar-
gued that "[d]ecertification creates uncertainty in the law for brief but
discernible periods of time because it follows publication of appellate
opinions in the advance sheets of the Official Reports," thus permitting
reliance upon the opinion as precedent before it becomes
depublished.2'
Another criticism is that insofar as depublication implies supreme
court disapproval of the opinion below, the depublication order de-
prives the losing party below of its right to a reasoned judgement-or
in this view worse still, it implies that the judgment itself was wrong.
22
B. Criticisms Discussed
1. Lack of Guidance
When the court orders an appellate opinion depublished, its rea-
son for doing so may on some occasions be fairly clear. For example,
two related appellate opinions may reach the supreme court at about
the same time, and the court may deny hearing in both but leave only
one published. However, in many, if not most situations, the reason for
the depublication order is not apparent. To that extent the critics are
quite correct: the order leaves the parties and the public without guid-
ance both as to why the order was entered, and as to what reasoning
backed the implicit determination that the opinion was in some respect
incorrect.
That, it must be conceded, is hardly an ideal state of affairs.
Whether it is better or worse on balance than the alternative of letting
the published opinion stand is another matter. While depublication
17. Id. at 1187.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1190.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1191-92.
22. See, e.g., id. at 1188; Lascher, Lascher At Large, 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 335, 344 (1977).
1984]
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may leave the lawyers and lower courts without guidance as to what
the supreme court considers the law to be, the alternative of straight
denial may leave them with a published decision, citable as precedent
and binding upon the trial courts, that stands for what the court consid-
ers the law is not. In terms of providing guidance for the development
of the law, the alternative of depublication is clearly preferable.
2. The Right to a Reasoned Judgment
I suppose there may be some psychological validity to the argu-
ment that the losing party may feel deprived of a valid judgment when
the opinion supporting it has been ordered depublished. However, I
have difficulty believing that a client who loses in the court of appeal
will feel additionally aggrieved if that court's opinion is depublished.
It is at least equally possible, I would think, that he would feel some-
what vindicated. In any event, as his attorney will no doubt explain,
depublication does not mean that the supreme court necessarily disap-
proves of the underpinnings of the decision. Nor does it mean that the
court considers the outcome to be wrong, just as a straight denial of
hearing does not necessarily carry with it the court's imprimatur.
Depublication is most frequently used when the court considers
the result to be correct, but regards a portion of the reasoning to be
wrong and misleading.23 There are times, to be sure, when the supreme
court considers the result to be wrong as well, but that is true also when
the court simply denies hearing. The court is not expected to, and can-
not, grant a hearing in all cases in which it considers the outcome erro-
neous. Unless one were to argue that the depublication alternative
should be eliminated as a means of inducing the supreme court to grant
hearing in a greater number of cases-and I have yet to hear anyone
make that argument seriously-I see nothing additionally improper in
the use of depublication orders in such situations.
3. Secrecy
Nor do I find a great deal of objective merit in the more genera-
lized criticism that there is something inappropriately secretive about
the depublication process. Depublished opinions are not shredded into
oblivion after all; copies are available for public examination, and for
analysis and comment by persons interested in the process. 24 Often,
these opinions are preserved for posterity in unofficial reporting sys-
tems that serve specialized segments of the bar. The only consequence
of a depublication order is that the opinion is not published in the Offi-
23. See Note, supra note I, at 1185 n.20 (quoting letter from former Chief Justice Wright).
24. Evidence of the accessibility of depublished opinions is amply provided by their collec-
tion in Note, supra note 1, at 1200-06, and Biggs, supra note 1, at 1594-96.
[Vol. 72:514
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cial Reports, and is therefore not citable as precedent.25 The same is
true, of course, of eighty to ninety percent of the court of appeal opin-
ions, which that court considers do not meet the criteria for
publication.26
Having said all this, I must acknowledge that I share with the crit-
ics a sense of discomfort about the process. Depublication is a
"stronger" alternative than straight denial. It not only eliminates the
court of appeal opinion as precedent, but it also removes that opinion
from the realm of judicial discourse, and therefore from the develop-
ment of the common law. If there are potentially practical alternatives
to the present practice of ordering depublication without explanation,
they deserve to be examined with care.
III
ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEPUBLICATION PROCEDURE
In my view, certain of the procedural suggestions to improve the
decertification process have considerable merit. For example, I can
think of no valid reason, if the practice is to continue, why depublica-
tion should not be supported by an express rule of court that acknowl-
edges the existence of the option and states in general terms the
occasions for its exercise. Such a rule would help to legitimize and
demystify the practice in the eyes of practitioners and the public. Such
a rule could also address the concerns that have been expressed regard-
ing the procedures by which the option is implemented-the problems
of public notice and the status of an appellate opinion pending action
on a decertification request. The adoption of such a rule would not,
however, satisfy the more substantive concern that depublication, or at
least depublication without commentary, is simply an unacceptable
means of shaping the law.
25. Opinions by the court of appeal that are not published may not "be cited or relied on by
a court or a party in any other action or proceeding .... " CAL. CT. R. 977(a). Thus, a depub-
lished opinion is unavailable as precedent. E.g., Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 872 n.8,
114 Cal. Rptr. 868, 873 n.8 (1974).
26. See supra note 2. In 1981-82 only 12.6% of all court of appeal majority opinions were
published. 1983 JUD. COUNCIL CAL. ANN. REP. 94.
27. As I have noted, very few decertification orders are made absent a petition for hearing.
See supra note 1. Where such requests do not accompany a petition for hearing, the party re-
questing decertification should, as a matter of professional courtesy, serve the request on all inter-
ested parties. Inasmuch as such requests are not acted upon immediately, there would be an
opportunity for those opposing the request to make their views known to the court. Some require-
ment of notice to all parties could be incorporated into a depublication rule.
Even under the present procedure, the precedential status of a decertified opinion prior to
publication of the bound volume from which it is deleted can easily be verified. One need only
refer to the Cumulative Subsequent History Table at the end of each volume of the Official
Reports.
1984]
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A. Depublication with a Statement of Reasons
One alternative to the current depublication practice is to permit
depublication to continue, but to require the court to include in its
decertification orders a statement of "specific reasons for decertifying,"
with a special designation of errors in criminal and constitutional
cases.2 8 Under this proposal, the published opinion would not be cita-
ble as precedent until hearing had been denied or the time for appeal
had elapsed,29 and the decertification order would itself be citable as
"indicative of the general thinking of the court."3 If a specification of
reasons means simply a statement that a majority of the court finds
some error in the appellate opinion likely to cause confusion in the
development of the law, such a statement can easily be made. In fact, it
can be made in a rule authorizing depublication under such circum-
stances, so that the court need only refer to the rule. But such a state-
ment would do little to remedy the defects of which critics have
complained.
If, however, specification of reasons means a brief critique of the
court of appeal's opinion, I see several problems. Agreement upon
such a statement would impose a substantial burden upon the supreme
court's already overtaxed screening process. It is difficult enough to
pass intelligently upon 150 items at a screening conference. I fear that
to reach consensus upon a statement of reasons for depublication
would be a heroic feat in such a short time. The attempt would be
provocative, most likely, of dissenting and concurring views. More-
over, it seems difficult to justify the burden in terms of benefit. The
court's statement of reasons would be of little value to anyone without
the opinion under critique. Thus, as a depublished opinion cannot be
cited as authority, citation of the depublication order would likely be of
little value. Finally, such a procedure would do nothing to correct the
perceived problem of the losing litigant in search of a reasoned expla-
nation for his defeat.
B. Statement Accompanying a Denial of Hearing
In 1979, a committee appointed by Chief Justice Bird to review the
selective publication system reached a severe conclusion regarding
depublication.3' In the committee's view, depublication, as a "distinct
form of substantive review" was "undesirable and should be brought to
an end" by a rule precluding decertification except for failure of the
28. Note, supra note 1, at 1194-96.
29. Id. at 1195 n.65.
30. Id. at 1197.
31. REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AN EFFECTIVE PUBLICA-
TION RULE, June 1, 1979.
[Vol. 72:514
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opinion to meet the specified standards for publication.32 In its place,
the committee recommended that the court revive its former practice of
"withholding approval from erroneous portions of court of appeal
opinions on denial of hearings."33
This suggestion echoes a practice that the supreme court engaged
in, sporadically, for some four decades, finally abandoning it altogether
in the mid-1940's.34 The court from time to time used a variety of ver-
bal formulae: in some cases it "withheld its approval" of all or part of
the opinion; in others it "disapproved" or "approved" part of the opin-
ion; in others it "was not to be understood" as approving or disapprov-
ing part or all of the opinion; and in still others it simply "expressed no
opinion" as to part or all of the opinion.s
This practice met with scholarly criticism. Some of this criticism
was based on the unexplained variation in phraseology. Some was
based on the ground that any commentary is in conflict with the propo-
sition, first declared in People v. Davis,36 and reiterated often
thereafter,37 that denial of a hearing implies neither approval nor dis-
approval of the opinion below.38 In light of that principle, critics won-
dered, what did it mean for the court explicitly to "withhold its
approval" from a particular opinion? Did it mean that the court in fact
disapproved? Or merely that the Davis rule was being applied in the
particular case? Or did it mean something in between; for example,
that the court doubted the correctness of part or all of the ruling below
but was not prepared (or did not choose) to express its opinion at the
time?
39
To be fair to the committee's proposal, the defects identified with
the court's former practice are not necessarily intrinsic to the concept of
commentary upon denial. Indeed, as one of the early commentators
32. Id. at 24 (quoting B. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS § 22, at 35
(1977)).
33. Id. at 25-26.
34. See B. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS § 22, at 36 (1977); Comment,
Courts: Significance of the Practice ofthe California Supreme Court of Commenting on the Opinion
ofthe District Court of Appeal When Denying 4 Hearing After Judgment, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 81
(1939) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Signficance]; Comment, Comments by the Supreme Court on
Denial of a Petition/or Hearing, 13 S. CAL. L. REv. 461 (1940).
35. Cases from the decade 1928 to 1938 in which the supreme court denied hearing and
commented upon the court of appeal opinion are collected and classified by the commenting lan-
guage used in Comment, Signficance, supra note 34, at 88-91.
36. 147 Cal. 346, 350, 81 P. 718, 720 (1905).
37. See Western Lithograph Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 11 Cal. 2d 156, 167-68, 78 P.2d
731, 737 (1938); Shelton v. City of Los Angeles, 206 Cal. 544, 550, 275 P. 421, 424 (1929); People
v. Rabe, 202 Cal. 409, 418-19, 261 P. 303, 307 (1927); In re Stevens, 197 Cal. 408, 423-24, 241 P.
88, 94 (1925); Bohn v. Bohn, 164 Cal. 532, 537-38, 129 P. 981, 984 (1913).
38. Comment, Signficance, supra note 34, at 82.
39. Id. at 83.
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observed, the confusion might be minimized if the court were to ex-
plain, by opinion or rule, precisely what it did mean by a phrase such
as "approval withheld. '40 Perhaps, as that commentator has suggested,
the court could establish that when it "withholds approval" from an
opinion, it really is saying:
"Whereas normally we express no views on denial of hearings, and are
not to be taken as either approving or disapproving of the opinion be-
low, in this case we think it appropriate to make an exception, and to
say that we doubt the soundness of the views expressed by the . . .
court of appeal.'
And, I suppose, the court could take one further step and state that the
usual principle of stare decisis as declared in Auto Equity Sales v.
Superior Court4 z does not apply to an opinion that bears such an insig-
nia of doubt.
It is possible that such a comment on denial phraseology would
help allay the general concern that there is something unduly secretive
about depublication, and to that extent it might serve a beneficial pur-
pose. Such a comment might also prove useful in those cases in which
the court has reservations regarding only a portion of the opinion, con-
sidering the remainder to provide helpful guidance in an uncharted
area of the law. However, this procedure would not give much satisfac-
tion to a losing litigant (much less to the author of the appellate opin-
ion); nor would it offer meaningful guidance as to the supreme court's
thinking on the legal principles involved. On the contrary, it could en-
gender additional confusion as to the basis for the court's explicit with-
holding of approval, and as to the degree of rejection such a statement
would imply. It is likely, I think, that pressures would mount toward
articulating more and more precise statements of the court's reasoning.
If attempts at commentary became bogged down in disagreement over
how the commentary should be phrased, or in the expression of differ-
ing views, the process could quickly exceed the limited time and re-
sources of the court. It might be desirable to experiment with such a
procedure on a limited basis, but I am skeptical about accepting it as a
wholesale replacement for depublication orders.
C Alternatives to Denial
An entirely different set of alternatives has on occasion been pro-
posed, aimed at facilitating the disposition of cases through grant and
retransfer to the court of appeal,4 3 or through grant of hearing limited
40. See Comment, supra note 14, at 816.
41. Comment, Signfficance, supra note 34, at 83.
42. 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455, 369 P.2d 937, 939-40, 20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323-24 (1962).
43. See Comment, supra note 14, at 807-11.
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to specified issues.' Both these alternatives, to the extent that they
might avoid denial of hearing, would have the effect of minimizing the
occasion for depublication. Both have potential; both have problems.
1. Grant and Retransfer
As I have mentioned, the supreme court rarely retransfers a case to
the court of appeal for reconsideration after a written opinion, except
"in light of' some authority that either the court of appeal overlooked
in its opinion or that was not available to the court of appeal at the time
it filed its opinion."a It has been suggested that the supreme court ex-
pand its use of the grant and retransfer option: The court should order
reconsideration of opinions it would otherwise have ordered depub-
lished, while giving the appellate court some indication in its retransfer
order as to how the supreme court would like to see the case come out
the second time.46
This suggestion touches upon several rather sensitive aspects of the
relationship between the two appellate tribunals. The court of appeal
presumably has already considered the matter with care. For the
supreme court to send the case back for "reconsideration" in the light
of nothing more than the authorities the intermediate court has already
taken into account seems a bit highhanded, at least. Such a procedure
could also prove futile, since in the absence of clear direction, the court
of appeal, as an autonomous court, would be fully free upon reconsid-
eration simply to confirm its earlier decision. While clear direction
might be possible in some cases, substantial question exists as to the
propriety of having the supreme court order the court of appeal to
modify its decision in a particular way.47 Finally, unless the supreme
court believed that the opinion under review reached an erroneous re-
sult, there would seem little point to a requirement that the court of
appeal, already overburdened, engage in further proceedings simply to
rewrite its opinion in the way a school child might be expected to re-
44. REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AN EFFECTIVE PUBLICA-
TION RULE, June 1, 1979, at 6, 27-28; see Comment, The California Supreme Court and Selective
Review, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 720 (1984).
45. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
46. Comment, supra note 14, at 807-11.
47. The California Constitution, article VI, § 12 provides that the supreme court "may,
before decision, transfer a cause from itself to a court of appeal. . . . The court to which a cause
is transferred has jurisdiction." The intent of this language is usually taken to mean that the
supreme court may either grant a hearing, in which it must decide all issues in the case, or it may,
"before [it reaches a] decision," retransfer the case to the sole jurisdiction of the court of appeal.
This was the view taken by Justice Houser of a predecessor to article VI, § 12. In the context
of the court's commentary on denial of hearing, Justice Houser maintained that the court has
.neither direct nor implied authority . . . to modify an opinion theretofore rendered by a ...
Court of Appeal. Wires v. Litle, 27 Cal. App. 2d 240, 246, 82 P.2d 388, 389 (1938) (Houser,
J., concurring).
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write an essay. Such concerns may underlie the supreme court's tradi-
tional reluctance to expand the grant and retransfer option.
2 Selective Review
That the Supreme Court should be able to exercise its review
power selectively, limiting review to specified issues decided by the
court of appeal, seems self-evidently appropriate. It is absurd that the
highest court in one of the largest states should be required to assume
responsibility for deciding every issue in a case simply because there is
one issue of sufficient significance to warrant a grant of hearing. The
pending proposed constitutional amendment,48 which would explicitly
authorize such selective review, seems eminently desirable. Further, I
would predict that such selective review would eliminate the need for
depublication in a substantial number of cases. I doubt, however, that
it would eliminate the need altogether.
CONCLUSION
Winston Churchill once said of democracy that it is the worst form
of government except for all the others. Though I would scarcely liken
depublication to democracy, the same logic applies. I am uncomfort-
able with depublication, mainly because it gives rise to so much mis-
understanding, and I favor restraint in its use. In my judgment, other
options are worth trying-I would include in that category the selective
use of commentary upon denial of hearing-in order that depublica-
tion be kept to a minimum. Unquestionably, the court's ability to grant
hearings limited to specified issues would prove useful in that regard as
well, and other solutions may surface. Meanwhile, if the choices are to
grant a hearing or to deny and leave published an opinion that could
lead to compounded error, the depublication alternative is preferable,
though certainly not ideal.
48. Senate Const. amend. No. 29 (as amended in Senate, Apr. 10, 1984) (introduced by Sen.
Watson, Mar. 4, 1983).
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